We consider an election that is solely concerned with redistribution of income. It is well known that when voters are selfish, there is no political equilibrium. We consider the case where voters are modestly altruistic. We demonstrate that modest altruism results in a unique political equilibrium.
, where e stands for equitable and efficient. We do not use a superscript i in this case since all the voters have identical utility functions and identical incomes.
Let X -i = x 1 , x 2 , ... x i-1 , x i+1, x N . That is, X -i is the distribution of income to the j voters not including voter i.
We will concentrate on the case where Σx j = Y. If we can show that X* is a Condorcet winner against all X such that Σx j = Y, then X* is a Condorcet winner against all X such that Σx j ≤ Y.
For a given total income, a necessary condition for the distribution X to be preferred by a majority to X* is that the median income voter under X must have higher income than under X*.
This is because X* beats all other X on distributional grounds; therefore, the median voter will only prefer X over X* if she receives a higher income under X than under X*.
Furthermore, for a given x i , every voter i will prefer that X -i is distributed as evenly as possible. This means that there are only (N + 1)/2 voters in the winning coalition and that the median voter (the one who has the least to gain) prefers that none of the other voters in the winning coalition get more than the median voter. That is, the distribution that has the best chance of beating X* is the one in which (N + 1)/2 voters in the winning coalition (W) each get x W > Y/N, and the
Plugging this into our formula U i = x i + B Y/N -BC Σ|x j -x |/N, we get:
Since BC Σ|x i -x |/N is based on deviations from the mean, we know that the sum of positive deviations from the mean (the last expression on the first line) is equal to the sum of negative deviations from the mean (the second line). Therefore, we ignore the second line and just multiply the last expression of the first line by two and get:
x W > Y/N. Therefore, if BC ≥ N/(N + 1), X* is a Condorcet winner.
q.e.d.
PROPOSITION 3:
If BC < N/(N + 1), then majority voting is intransitive.
Proof:
By the last equality in the above theorem, X* will lose to another distribution. So suppose that we have an X ≠ X*. Let x m be the median income.
If x m ≤ Y/N, then X* will be preferred by a majority of voters to X. 3 The voters whose incomes were originally strictly less than Y/N will be better off on both selfish and altruistic only one voter, n, is hurt on the selfish component. Indeed one or more voters may benefit on the selfish dimension as well. Therefore, N -1 voters will vote for this redistribution.
Therefore, every unequal allocation loses to some other allocation and the equal allocation loses to some unequal allocation. Thus, we have intransitivity.
q.e.d
Thus, we see that some altruism is necessary for majority rule voting on income distribution to be stable.
So far, we have analyzed the case where all of the voters are equally altruistic. It is insightful to ask what happens if there is a subset, S, of purely selfish voters. Clearly, if this subset is a majority, then intransitivity will again arise because this majority will vote to give itself more than the average income. But there is always another distribution that will take away the excess "pie"
from the K member of this majority who received the most pie and redistribute this amount to the other members of the majority and the K people who originally received less than the average. A majority of voters will prefer this second distribution to the original distribution because this majority is better off on both selfish and altruistic grounds if they are so inclined. The logic can repeat itself and we are on the way to intransitivity.
We will next consider the case where the number of purely selfish people is S < (N + 1)/2 and the remaining N -S voters are altruistic. q.e.d.
We can see immediately that the transitivity requirements for BC are greater than when there are no selfish individuals and S = 0.
So far, I have not explicitly considered candidate motivation. However, it should be clear from the propositions that if an equilibrium exists, it will be an equilibrium for candidates who only want to win as well as for candidates who have similar altruistic preferences as the voters. 4
DISCUSSION
There is a significant body of work on positive theories of income distribution and redistribution when all of the voters are selfish (see, for example, work by Coughlin, 1986 , Lindbeck and Weibul, 1987 , Wittman, 1989 , and Bishop et. al., 1991 . Unlike the analysis here, these papers have uncertainty built into their models --even though the candidates believe that a voter is getting more from candidate D than from candidate R, the voter may still vote for R. 5 Given the appropriate assumptions, probability creates enough voting inertia to guarantee an equilibrium.
There is an even more extensive and varied literature on normative criteria for income distribution and welfare (see, for example, Atkinson, 1976 , Chakravarty, 1990 , Roemer, 1996 , and Jorgenson, 1997 .
In contrast, here, we have a positive theory of elections when some or all of the voters temper their selfish interests with some concern for the distribution of income. This combination of the positive theory of elections with normatively inclined voters is very rare, a major exception being Dixit and Londregan (1998) . 6 In their model, one candidate prefers higher average income, while the other candidate prefers a more equitable distribution. They assume that income redistribution is costly and that richer people on average prefer less redistribution than poorer people do. The candidates are uncertain about the election outcome and maximize expected plurality. In order to insure a pure-strategy equilibrium, the authors assume that the candidates' positions are not too close; they do this by assuming that the candidates themselves have strong preferences for the policies. Thus the model that I presented here is quite different because it does not assume probabilistic voting functions, preferences for equity being a function of the voter's pre-tax income, or taxes being uniform for people of similar pre-tax incomes. The results differ, as well. In particular, my model produces an egalitarian outcome when transfers are not costly, while in their model the median income voter gains the most. In my model, there is a clear demarcation between those parameter values that lead to a majority-rule equilibrium and those that produce intransitivity.
In the real-world, the costless transfers assumed in this model do not occur. For example, taxes and subsidies may discourage effort and GNP. Therefore, full equality may not be achieved even if voters are altruistic because the incentive effects on effort might drastically reduce the overall size of the pie. People are only mildly altruistic --the rich are willing to be collectively taxed, but would prefer that the rest of the rich paid taxes and they personally avoided them. Because people are only mildly altruistic, the altruism benefit that a rich individual receives from her own taxes being redistributed to the poor does not compensate for the direct loss and so the person may choose to work less hard. That is, a million dollars taken from one rich person only increases the average by $1.00 if there are a million poor people. While a rich person might agree to do this when there are 100,000 other rich people doing this as well, the rich person would still prefer that the 99,999 other rich people were contributing and the particular rich person was contributing not at all. As a result, when effort is voluntary, we would not see pure income equality even if everyone had altruism parameters BC > 1 because equality of income would reduce the size of the pie.
We have provided the critical values (BC > 1 and C < .5) such that (1) altruism produces equality in a pure income redistribution world, and (2) the distaste for inequality is not so severe that a person might be against Pareto improving outcomes. But what kind of tradeoffs are implied by these parameters and how do these tradeoffs accord with our own sense of altruism?
First, consider the BY/N term. Suppose the following choice were presented to you: if your income were to go down by $10,000 a year, then average income would go up by $1,000 a year.
Further assume that the overall variability in income does not change so that the BC Σ(|x i -x |)/N term remains constant. If you live in Italy, then your sacrifice of $10,000 would result in an increase in per capita income of $1,000 for approximately 60 million people. Now such a trade-off is unlikely, but if such a trade off were presented to you, would you be willing to take the sacrifice? If the answer is yes, then you weight B > 10.
Turning to the distribution term, suppose that total income remained constant, but that the richest 10 million Italians give $10,000 to the poorest 10 million Italians. Then the Σ(|x i -x |)/N term is reduced by 10000/3 (as 20 million out of 60 million Italians are affected). If you would be willing to sacrifice $10,000 to collectively achieve this outcome, then this means that for you BC > 3.
If you were the only rich Italian doing this, then the Σ(|x i -x |)/N term would be reduced by only 10,000/30,000,000 (as only the equivalent of 2 out of 60 million Italians are affected by $10,000). To do this on your own would require BC to be greater than 30,000,000. Essentially, the requirement for a collectively altruistic act is much smaller than the requirement for an individually altruistic act.
they want to help those with low pre-tax income), but each voter is solely concerned with her own post-tax income. Thus Roemer's model is quite different from the model considered here
